What is good land use? From rights to relationship by Burdon, P.
PUBLISHED VERSION 
 
Burdon, Peter David.  What is good land use? From rights to relationship.  Melbourne University 
Law Review,  2010; 34(3):708-735  

































Open Access Policy 
The Review supports open access. Recent articles published in the Review appear free of charge on 
austlii.edu.au (in html format) and on the Review's website (in searchable pdf format). In accordance with 
the Review's Publication Policy, authors may also publish the searchable pdf format of their article on 
SSRN or an equivalent database, without obtaining the consent of the Editors, so long as no fee is 
charged to access that database. Authors may do so immediately upon receiving the final pdf file of their 
article from the Editors; they do not need to wait any particular length of time after the print edition has 
been released. 
In accordance with the Review's Publication Policy, authors must obtain the Editors' consent if they wish 
to republish their article in a larger published collection or on an online forum that users access for a fee. 
As noted above, to facilitate the double blind refereeing process, the Review requires contributors to 


























     
 
WHAT IS GOOD LAND USE? FROM RIGHTS TO 
RELATIONSHIP 
PETER BURDON* 
[Industrial agriculture is the dominant method for feeding an increasingly urbanised world. 
However, a growing body of literature suggests that industrial practices are unsustainable and risk 
global food security. This article examines the legal–philosophical dimension of this literature and 
the vision of good land use promoted in both industrial and agrarian farming practices. It argues that 
industrial agriculture is premised on a concept of private property that promotes individual 
preference satisfaction, separates people from place and fragments landscape. In response, this 
article examines agrarian farming practices as a means of re-conceiving private property so that it is 
seen to embrace not only human good, but also ethics and the land itself. By re-conceiving private 
property as embracing these factors, private property may offer but one solution to the agricultural 
crisis.] 
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I   IN T R O D U C T I O N 
Food business is far and away the most important business in the world. Every-
thing else is a luxury. Food is what you need to sustain life every day. Food is 
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fuel. You can’t run a tractor without fuel and you can’t run a human being with-
out it either. Food is the absolute beginning.1 
There are some basic truths that will shape the future of farming and land use 
in the 21st century. The first is that there will be ‘a steady increase in the con-
sumption of food and fiber produced by agriculture’.2 The second is a deepening 
environmental crisis and the loss of healthy farming land.3 Jason Clay notes that 
these ‘two trends are on a collision course’4 and present a significant challenge 
to global food security5 and environmental health. The western world’s conver-
sion from agrarian, local, fully integrated food systems to industrialised, mono-
cultural agricultural production has a number of adverse consequences. 
Throughout each level of our food system we can trace this crisis as it manifests 
in soil erosion, poisoned groundwater, loss of biodiversity, toxic chemicals in 
food and fibre, loss of beauty and a myriad of other environmental and social 
problems. Exacerbating this crisis is the continued expansion of this farming 
system around the world. 
The agricultural crisis is fundamentally a crisis of culture, a situation first 
described over 30 years ago in Wendell Berry’s classic book, The Unsettling of 
America.6 A central theme in this book is the importance of relationship with 
community and with the land. Berry laments that we routinely neglect these 
relationships and regard the land as an abstract, fragmented entity, with individu-
als using distinct parcels of it.7 We value its parts and underestimate the ecologi-
cal and social bonds.8 This perspective extends beyond the issue of land use and 
characterises human ethics and values.9 Speaking about the importance of 
relationship, Berry notes: 
A healthy farm culture can be based only upon familiarity and can grow only 
among a people soundly established upon the land … The growth of such a cul-
 
 1 Dwayne Andreas, quoted in Christopher D Cook, Diet for a Dead Planet: How the Food 
Industry Is Killing Us (New Press, 2004) 3. 
 2 Jason Clay, World Agriculture and the Environment: A Commodity-by-Commodity Guide to 
Impacts and Practices (Island Press, 2004) vii. The global population is expected to rise by 
nearly 3 billion people during the first half of the century. For some areas, population growth 
currently threatens food security. For a detailed analysis, see Lester R Brown, Outgrowing the 
Earth: The Food Security Challenge in an Age of Falling Water Tables and Rising Temperatures 
(W W Norton & Company, 2004) 22–39; Lester R Brown, Plan B 4.0: Mobilizing to Save Civili-
zation (W W Norton & Company, 2009) 31–51. 
 3 Clay, above n 2, vii. 
 4 Ibid. 
 5 Food security exists when all people, at all times, have access to sufficient, safe and nutritious 
food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life. See generally 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Investing in Food Security, UN 
Doc I/I1230E/1/11.09/1000 (November 2009). 
 6 Wendell Berry, The Unsettling of America: Culture & Agriculture (Sierra Club Books, 1977). 
Lawrence Rosen, Law as Culture: An Invitation (Princeton University Press, 2006) provides an 
insightful introduction to the relationship between law and culture. For an introduction to cul-
tural integration and legal evolution, see Michael McCann (ed), Law And Social Movements 
(Ashgate, 2006). 
 7 Berry, The Unsettling of America, above n 6, 39–50. 
 8 See Eric T Freyfogle, ‘Wendell Berry and the Limits of Populism’ in Jason Peters (ed), Wendell 
Berry: Life and Work (University Press of Kentucky, 2007) 173. 
 9 Berry, The Unsettling of America, above n 6, 17–26. 
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ture was once a strong possibility in the farm communities of this country. We 
now have only the sad remnants of those communities. If we allow another 
generation to pass without doing what is necessary to enhance and embolden 
the possibility now perishing with them, we will lose it altogether. And then we 
will not only invoke calamity — we will deserve it.10 
The agricultural crisis provides a pertinent opportunity to consider a basic 
question: what is good land use? My intention in this article is to investigate one 
important aspect of this question, the legal–philosophical concept of private 
property.11 Thus, I am focusing on the idea rather than the institution of private 
property.12 Laura Underkuffler explains this distinction, noting that private 
‘[p]roperty is both an idea and an institution; it is how people envision it — “that 
is, what concept they have of it” — and also how it is, as a social, political, and 
legal institution, implemented to resolve particular conflicts in society.’13 
Naturally, there are many points of connection between the two. However, an 
investigation into the idea allows one to understand the intellectual basis of the 
institution and to uncover the law’s main message about what it means to own 
the land.14 
In investigating the idea of private property, I will contrast two visions of land 
use, described broadly in terms of industrial and agrarian perspectives. From the 
industrial perspective, the question of good land use is considered in economic 
terms. Land use is good if it increases production and maximises profit. To 
achieve these goals, it preferences large-scale monocultures, machinery, genetic 
technology and inorganic pest control.15 Industrial practices reflect a vision of 
good land use that developed during the industrial revolution, when commercial 
interests played a key role in developing the legal idea of private property16 and 
reshaping this institution to expand the types of land use it prescribed.17 The 
changes initiated during this period are reinforced by current industrial land use 
practices. 
From this analysis of the industrial perspective, I will note that the idea of 
private property is premised on individualism and the liberty to use one’s 
property in a manner that maximises individual preferences. Further, the idea 
 
 10 Ibid 43–4 (emphasis altered). 
 11 In taking this focus, I expressly acknowledge other separate and intersecting contributions to the 
agricultural crisis, including free trade agreements, commercial pressure and the role of con-
sumer pricing. 
 12 For an introduction into the ‘idea’ of private property, see generally J E Penner, The Idea of 
Property in Law (Clarendon Press, 1997); Margaret Davies, Property: Meanings, Histories, 
Theories (Routledge-Cavendish, 2007). 
 13 Laura S Underkuffler, The Idea of Property: Its Meaning and Power (Oxford University Press, 
2003) 121 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 
 14 See Eric T Freyfogle, ‘Ownership and Ecology’ (1993) 43 Case Western Reserve Law Review 
1269. 
 15 See Andrew Kimbrell, ‘Learning to See What You Are Looking at’ in Andrew Kimbrell (ed), 
Fatal Harvest: The Tragedy of Industrial Agriculture (Island Press, 2002) 84, 84–9. 
 16 My analysis will focus particularly on private property. For ease of communication I will use the 
term ‘property’ where appropriate. I will also use the term ‘liberal theory’ to describe the main-
stream or orthodox conception of private property. 
 17 See Eric T Freyfogle, ‘Property Rights, the Market, and Environmental Change in Twentieth-
Century America’ (Research Paper No 00-01, College of Law, University of Illinois, November 
2001) 3–4. 
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focuses on interactions between people, rather than with physical nature. By 
removing land from the equation, private property separates people from place 
and provides no legal reason for ‘relationship’. Following from this point, private 
property views the land as a ‘bundle of rights’, which can be divided into 
discrete parcels and used with no overarching vision of natural health. Taken 
together, I contend that this understanding of private property is integral to the 
industrial vision of land use and represents one of the primary elements of the 
agricultural crisis. While other authors have critiqued the idea of private property 
in a similar fashion,18 this article is unique in contextualising the critique and 
demonstrating its specific application to the pressing issue of industrial agricul-
ture. 
If we are to sustain a growing population and preserve a healthy environment, 
I contend that our idea of private property needs to be reformed to recognise 
relationship as a guiding principle. In order to do this, I will consider an alterna-
tive vision of good land use, described broadly as agrarianism. Agrarian farming 
methods concentrate on small-scale polycultures and seek to shape human 
practice to fit the contours, climate and attributes of the land. Pests are controlled 
organically and/or through companion planting and permaculture principles.19 
Importantly, agrarianism does not offer an official theory of private property.20 
However, it is a system of land use premised on the existence of private property, 
and from close analysis of its practices I will attempt to extrapolate an alternative 
idea of private property. This article is unique in attempting this synthesis and 
will shift our discussion beyond human property rights to include relationship 
with place, ecosystem relationships and ethical considerations. 
I will conclude by noting that agrarianism provides a viable alternative to the 
way we produce food and offers guidance as to how we can revise our idea of 
private property to reflect growing ecological needs. Agrarian philosophy is 
being practised by a growing number of people throughout the world who 
recognise the environmental impacts of current land use practices and are 
 
 18 See, eg, John M Meyer, ‘The Concept of Private Property and the Limits of the Environmental 
Imagination’ (2009) 37 Political Theory 99; David B Hunter, ‘An Ecological Perspective on 
Property: A Call for Judicial Protection of the Public’s Interest in Environmentally Critical 
Resources’ (1988) 12 Harvard Environmental Law Review 311; J Peter Byrne, ‘Green Property’ 
(1990) 7 Constitutional Commentary 239; Joseph L Sax, ‘Property Rights and the Economy of 
Nature: Understanding Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council’ (1993) 45 Stanford Law Review 
1433; Terry W Frazier, ‘The Green Alternative to Classical Liberal Property Theory’ (1995) 20 
Vermont Law Review 299; Terry W Frazier, ‘Protecting Ecological Integrity within the Balanc-
ing Function of Property Law’ (1998) 28 Environmental Law 53; Lynda L Butler, ‘The Pathol-
ogy of Property Norms: Living within Nature’s Boundaries’ (2000) 73 Southern California Law 
Review 927; Carl J Circo, ‘Does Sustainability Require a New Theory of Property Rights?’ 
(2009) 58 University of Kansas Law Review 91. 
 19 See Kimbrell, above n 15, 84–9. I do not wish to imply that agrarian communities all officially 
practise permaculture. 
 20 Wendell Berry notes that ‘agrarianism is primarily a practice, a set of attitudes, a loyalty, and a 
passion; it is an idea only secondarily and at a remove’: Wendell Berry, ‘The Whole Horse: The 
Preservation of the Agrarian Mind’ in Andrew Kimbrell (ed), Fatal Harvest: The Tragedy of 
Industrial Agriculture (Island Press, 2002) 7, 8. 
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choosing to enter into a new relationship with nature.21 The freedom to choose a 
new idea of ownership, as individuals and as a community, is central to the 
liberal theory of private property. Further, as an evolving social institution, 
collective action is fundamental to the reform of private property. 
I I   TH E  IN D U S T R I A L PE R S P E C T I V E 
Industrial agriculture is the largest industry on the planet. It has ‘modified the 
natural landscape more than any other human activity.’22 It arose as a product of 
the industrial revolution during the late 18th and 19th centuries. Felipe Fernández-
Armesto notes that the first stage of the intensification of food production was 
scientific stockbreeding and soil management, followed by the introduction of 
new technology into planting, fertilising, harvesting and drainage.23 There was 
no pattern beyond these basic steps because conditions were so various. In the 
Americas and Australasia the focus turned to ‘huge-scale, increasingly mecha-
nized farming and ranching.’24 The transition from agrarian to industrial agricul-
ture in America has been described as follows: 
People first filled and then departed the landscape. Engine-driven machines had 
essentially finished replacing draft-horse and human labor by the 1950s. Hybrid 
corn and other highly bred crops requiring synthetic fertilizers and pesticides 
replaced well-established varieties. Increasingly, farmers’ traditional knowledge 
and agrarian culture were displaced by a managerial and industrial culture — a 
profound shift in the foundations of society.25 
To carry out these activities, industrial interests promoted a new vision of 
private ownership and the rights and responsibilities of landowners.26 Harvard 
legal historian Morton Horwitz notes: 
Law, once conceived of as protective, regulative, paternalistic and, above all, a 
paramount expression of the moral sense of the community, had come to be 
thought of as facilitative of individual desires and as simply reflective of the 
existing organization of economic and political power.27 
Fundamental to this shift was the idea that private property entailed the right to 
use the land more intensely than had been practised by previous generations. For 
example, communities that once enjoyed water laws that protected natural flow 
had these removed so that industries could draw more water and even pollute the 
 
 21 Aspects of agrarian philosophy can be seen in community gardens, urban farms, community-
supported agriculture, and guerrilla gardening. For a fascinating account, see Joel Salatin, Every-
thing I Want to Do Is Illegal: War Stories from the Local Food Front (Polyface, 2007); Andrea 
Gaynor, Harvest of the Suburbs: An Environmental History of Growing Food in Australian 
Cities (University of Western Australia Press, 2006); Sharon Astyk and Aaron Newton, A Nation 
of Farmers: Defeating the Food Crisis on American Soil (New Society Publishers, 2009). 
 22 Clay, above n 4, 3. 
 23 Felipe Fernández-Armesto, Near a Thousand Tables: A History of Food (Free Press, 2002) 191. 
 24 Ibid. 
 25 Paul Hawken, Amory B Lovins and L Hunter Lovins, Natural Capitalism: The Next Industrial 
Revolution (Earthscan, revised ed, 2010) 190–1 (citations omitted). 
 26 See Morton J Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law: 1780–1860 (Harvard University 
Press, 1977) 253. 
 27 Ibid. 
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system. Industrial parties required the right to emit smoke that degraded air 
quality, to make noise that scared livestock, and on occasion to emit sparks 
which had the potential to set wheat fields on fire. Waterwheels disrupted the 
migration of fish and tall buildings blocked sunlight.28 The legal idea of private 
property was reconceptualised to promote market growth ‘at the expense of 
farmers, workers, consumers, and other less powerful groups within the soci-
ety.’29 
Over the next hundred years, western lawmakers entrenched this shift in posi-
tive law.30 Land was redefined as a commodity, which could be used, exploited 
and even destroyed to satisfy production and profit. We can learn a great deal 
more about the changes in property law that occurred during this period by 
investigating the legal ideas that informed them. I will begin this analysis with 
the notion of individual liberty, which is central to the modern idea of private 
property. 
A  Individualism and Preference Satisfaction 
Private property received its first sophisticated definition in the Roman con-
cept of dominium.31 Roman jurists did not describe the normative content of 
dominium and left its meaning to develop from use.32 However, during the 
revival of Roman law during the 11th century, jurists defined dominium as akin to 
‘lordship’ and further noted that it was a ‘sovereign, ultimate, or “absolute” right 
to claim title and hence the possession and enjoyment of a thing.’33 While the 
institution of private property has never reflected such absolute language,34 the 
idea of dominion has been maintained in cultural narratives35 and ‘lay’36 
 
 28 Freyfogle, ‘Property Rights’, above n 17, 4. 
 29 Horwitz, above n 26, 253–4. 
 30 Ibid. 
 31 Richard Pipes, Property and Freedom (Alfred A Knopf, 1999) xv. This early conception is 
important because ‘Roman ideas about private and public property provide a kind of DNA of 
legal ownership, the intellectual structure within which most later legal thought has developed’: 
Joshua Getzler, ‘Roman Ideas of Landownership’ in Susan Bright and John Dewar (eds), Land 
Law: Themes and Perspectives (Oxford University Press, 1998) 81, 81. Getzler notes further 
(citations omitted): 
It can no longer be doubted that the English common law of property was deeply influenced 
by the Roman doctrines of possession, title, and servitudes. It follows that all cultivated law 
students in common law … should have some awareness of Roman and Civilian doctrines of 
landownership. 
  See also S F C Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common Law (Butterworths, 2nd ed, 1981) 
119, which notes that common law ideas of ‘seisin’ and ‘right’ were ‘for ever dazzled by the 
Roman vision of possession and ownership’. 
 32 Barry Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law (Oxford University Press, 1962) 153–7. 
 33 Getzler, above n 31, 82. 
 34 Despite such absolute language, dominium was qualified, for as Peter Birks notes, ‘no commu-
nity could tolerate ownership literally unrestricted in its content’: Peter Birks, ‘The Roman Law 
Concept of Dominium and the Idea of Absolute Ownership’ [1985] Acta Juridica 1, 1. 
 35 Certainly the most influential cultural narratives addressing this point are Stoic humanism and 
the biblical granting of dominion in Genesis. 
 36 I am borrowing the term ‘lay’ from J W Harris, Property & Justice (Clarendon Press, 1996) 119, 
who observes that ‘[c]ontemporary property theorists in the English-speaking world commonly 
pose a contrast between the lay and the legal view of property.’ 
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understandings of property. From this perspective it matters a great deal how 
‘real, socially-situated, flesh and blood people’37 understand private ownership. 
Underkuffler notes: 
From the earliest moments of childhood, we feel the urge to assert ourselves 
through the language of possession against the real or imagined predations of 
others. ‘Property’ as an assertion of self and control of one’s environment pro-
vides human beings with a place of deep psychological refuge. With its con-
creteness and its unfailing assurances, property promises to protect us from 
change and from our fear that we will leave no evidence of our passage through 
this world.38 
During the agricultural revolution, the notion of dominion was given tangible 
legal support through the popularisation of liberal political theory. The principles 
most commonly associated with liberal theory include freedom, toleration, 
autonomy and individual rights.39 Of these ideals, the ‘deepest commitment of 
liberal political philosophy is to individualism’40 and to providing freedom to 
fulfil individual potential.41 Indeed, liberals hold that individual human persons 
are the most important factor in social and political matters. One may have an 
interest (and indeed many liberals do) in community, the environment and non-
human animals, but ‘for a liberal such interest is always secondary or deriva-
tive.’42 
Under the influence of liberalism the ‘idea’ of private property strengthened in 
its pursuit of personal preferences and desires. The important idea of the ‘com-
mon good’, which limited individual property rights for the good of the commu-
nity, was soon eroded.43 Joseph William Singer encapsulates this shift in the 
concept of the ‘ownership model’. He explains: 
We presume that most uses of property are self-regulating, in that only the 
owner is legitimately interested and others have no legitimate claims to control 
what the owner does with his own property. Substantial freedom to control 
one’s property without interference by government regulation is believed to 
promote both individual autonomy and economic efficiency.44 
The ownership model is pervasive in western law and in countries that have 
imported western property law and theory. However, there is a growing recogni-
tion that it is misleading, morally deficient and contributes significantly to 
environmental harm. Indeed, the ownership model encourages landowners to use 
their property with no regard for the needs of others. It focuses on self-interest 
 
 37 Paul Babie, ‘How We Control the Environment and Others’ in Peter Burdon (ed), Exploring Wild 
Law: The Philosophy of Earth Jurisprudence (Wakefield Press, 2011) 279. 
 38 Underkuffler, The Idea of Property, above n 13, 1 (citations omitted). 
 39 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Liberalism’ in Edward Craig (ed) The Shorter Routledge Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Routledge, 2005) 570, 570. 
 40 Ibid 572 (emphasis altered). See generally Andreas Kalyvas and Ira Katznelson, Liberal 
Beginnings: Making a Republic for the Moderns (Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
 41 Frazier, above n 18, 300. 
 42 Waldron, above n 39, 572. 
 43 Freyfogle, ‘Property Rights’, above n 17, 4–5. 
 44 Joseph William Singer, The Edges of the Field: Lessons on the Obligations of Ownership 
(Beacon Press, 2000) 3. 
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and abhors obligation. As Singer notes, ‘ownership and obligation are opposites’ 
in this framework, as are ‘property and regulation.’45 Indeed, if private property 
is conceived of as individual ownership, and ownership means power without 
obligation, we have fashioned a framework which advances the owner above all 
else. According to Singer, ‘we are invited to live as if we were the only ones that 
mattered … we are invited to live as if we were alone.’46 
Yet property does not exist in a vacuum, and our choices have real and very 
important impacts on human beings and the environment.47 Leaving theory aside 
for one moment, we can discern the ownership model in the pervasive use of 
toxic products employed by industrial landowners. Here, the mantra is ‘if it is 
legal, it is acceptable’, and in the absence of regulation, landowners behave as 
though they were isolated and prioritise their own preferences and needs above 
the community and the land. As a consequence, global pesticide use has more 
than doubled in the past 30 years to approximately 5 million metric tonnes per 
year.48 In Australia, pesticide sales increased from $1100 million in 1996 to 
$1600 million in 1999, representing a 40 per cent increase in nominal terms.49 
Sales during 2006–07 remained relatively constant at $1648.81 million.50 The 
‘[w]orldwide environmental costs of pesticide is estimated to be $100 billion per 
year.’51 
Today, toxic residues from pesticides can be found everywhere: ‘in most of the 
major rivers and groundwater; “lodged in the bodies of fish, birds, reptiles and 
domestic and wild animals”; “stored in the bodies of the vast majority of human 
beings”; found even in that most sacred nectar, mother’s milk.’52 Certainly, what 
some landowners view as ‘individual’ or ‘isolated’ choices actually take place 
within a vast network of interconnected relationships. A sophisticated analysis of 
the environmental impacts from agricultural pesticides comes from the United 
States: 
the evidence shows clearly that pesticides are, very likely, in your backyard: in 
your child’s schoolyard, in the stream by the park, in the river or lake in which 
you swim, in the water you drink. According to a 1998 analysis by the Califor-
nia Public Interest Research Group, nearly 4 million Californians live within 
half a mile of heavy applications of pesticides, a third of which are ‘designated 
 
 45 Ibid 6. 
 46 Ibid. 
 47 See Joseph L Sax, ‘Takings, Private Property and Public Rights’ (1971) 81 Yale Law Journal 
149, 152. 
 48 Clay, above n 2, 53. See also Monica Moore, ‘Hidden Dimensions of Damage: Pesticides and 
Health’ in Andrew Kimbrell (ed), Fatal Harvest: The Tragedy of Industrial Agriculture (Island 
Press, 2002) 245; Rai Kookana and Ray Correll, Environmental Impact of Pesticides: A Risk 
Based Approach (2002) <http://www.clw.csiro.au/staff/KookanaR/Environ_Impact_Pesticides 
_Sept2002.pdf>. 
 49 John C Radcliffe, Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering, Pesticide Use 
in Australia (2002) 9 <http://www.atse.org.au/resource-centre/func-startdown/217/>. 
 50 CropLife Australia, Some Facts about Pesticide Sales in Australia (December 2008) 
<http://www.croplifeaustralia.org.au/default.asp?V_DOC_ID=1756>. 
 51 Kookana and Correll, above n 48. This figure is given in United States dollars. 
 52 Cook, above n 1, 160–1 (citations omitted). 
     
716 Melbourne University Law Review  [Vol 34 
     
by state or federal regulatory agencies as carcinogens, reproductive toxins or 
acute nerve poisons’.53 
Outside of the human community, pesticide use has greatly affected bird life. 
Every year in the United States agricultural pesticides alone kill an estimated 
67 million birds.54 For those that survive, many are left with an array of side 
effects, including ‘[w]eight loss, increased susceptibility to predation, decreased 
disease resistance, lack of interest in mating and defending territory, and aban-
donment of nestlings’.55 Studies in Australia have also detected pesticide residue 
in over 15 ground and surface water systems.56 Similarly, in the United States, 
more than 139 different types of pesticide have been detected in groundwater.57 
Atrazine58 was found in 99.9 per cent of samples in one United States study59 
and the levels of atrazine found in most of the samples were unsafe for aquatic 
life or for human drinking. Further, a study in 1992 by the United States Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency found that 10.4 per cent of community wells 
‘contained detectible levels of one or more pesticides’.60 These statistics pale in 
comparison to levels found in rivers and streams. State regulators in California 
detected pesticides in 95 per cent of the locations tested in the Central Valley.61 
Over half of these sites recorded levels of pesticides that exceeded safe levels for 
aquatic life and human consumption.62 In Kentucky, where farmers apply 
roughly 4.5 million pounds of pesticide each year, the State Department for 
Environmental Protection discovered atrazine and metolachlor63 in all of the 26 
river sites they examined. Simazine64 was found in 91 percent of sites.65 
 
 53 Ibid 166 (citations omitted). 
 54 Susan Kegley, Lars Neumeister and Timothy Martin, Californians for Pesticide Reform, 
Disrupting the Balance: Ecological Impacts of Pesticides in California (1999) 1 <http://www. 
panna.org/sites/default/files/DisruptingtheBalance1999.pdf>. 
 55 Ibid. See also US Fish & Wildlife Service, Pesticides and Birds (2000) <http://library.fws.gov/ 
pubs/mbd_pesticides-3-00.pdf>. 
 56 See Kookana and Correll, above n 48. 
 57 Roy F Spalding et al, ‘Herbicides in Ground Water beneath Nebraska’s Management Systems 
Evaluation Area’ (2003) 32 Journal of Environmental Quality 92, 92. 
 58 Atrazine is an organic compound consisting of a s-triazine-ring. Although banned in the 
European Union, it is still one of the most widely used herbicides in the world today. It is com-
monly used to stop pre- and post-broadleaf and grassy weeds in major crops. 
 59 Spalding et al, above n 57, 95. See also Kookana and Correll, above n 48, where they draw 
specific attention to the risk of endocrine disruption from contamination. 
 60 Edwin D Ongley, ‘Control of Water Pollution from Agriculture’ (FAO Irrigation and Drainage 
Paper No 55, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 1996) 54 <ftp://ftp.fao. 
org/agl/aglw/docs/idp55e.pdf>. 
 61 California Sportfishing Protection Alliance, Angling Groups Protest Agricultural Pollution Cite 
Impacts to Fishery Health and Human Consumption (16 November 2002) The Fish Sniffer 
Online <http://www.fishsniffer.com/guest/111602cspa.html>. 
 62 Ibid. 
 63 Metolachlor is an organic compound, commonly used in grass and broadleaf weed control in 
corn, soybean, peanuts, sorghum and cotton crops. It contains carcinogens and has been proven 
to be toxic for aquatic life. 
 64 Simazine is an artificial compound used to control broad-leaved weeds and annual grasses. 
 65 Department for Environmental Protection (Kentucky), Pesticides in Kentucky River (2000). 
Groundwater pollution is further exacerbated by non-point source pollution (‘NPSP’). Unlike 
pollution from point sources such as industrial and sewage treatment plants, NPSP comes from 
many diffuse sources. Polluted run-off is caused by rainfall or snowmelt moving over and 
through the ground. As the run-off moves, it picks up and carries away human-made pollutants, 
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Importantly, pesticides are also carried in the air. The Unites States Geological 
Survey states that ‘[n]early every pesticide that has been investigated has been 
detected in air, rain, snow, or fog across the Nation at different times of year.’66 A 
slow breeze can carry a pesticide vast distances and become ‘a source of human 
exposure or environmental contamination several hundred feet or several 
hundred miles away.’67 Diazinon,68 a highly toxic agent sprayed on nuts and 
stone fruit, actually increases in concentration as time passes.69 One community 
at high risk from agricultural pollution is California, where decades of expanding 
urban sprawl have bridged the gap between agricultural land and urban living. 
More than 90 per cent of pesticides used in California are likely to drift else-
where and one third are highly toxic to humans.70 A 2003 study by Californians 
for Pesticide Reform stated that ‘Californians are routinely exposed to concentra-
tions of pesticides in air that exceed levels of health concern, often by large 
margins.’71 Samples of two pesticides, metam-sodium72 and chlorpyrifos,73 were 
found at levels some 111 and 184 times greater than the acute exposure standards 
set by the Californian government for young children.74 
Clearly, the ubiquitous spread of these toxins is a serious matter that affects 
both environmental and public health. It demonstrates how the idea of private 
property, grounded in individual preferences, can influence a form of land use 
that ignores our relationship with neighbours and the land. Indeed, the spread of 
these toxins throughout the environment demonstrates in a very tangible way that 
the choices we make as property owners have consequences that flow beyond 
our borders and ourselves. By ignoring these important relationships, the legal 
idea of private property is playing a fundamental role in the agricultural crisis. 
 
finally depositing them into watersheds through lakes, rivers, wetlands, coastal waters, and even 
underground drinking water. For information on how NPSP contributes to environmental harm in 
the United States, see United States Environmental Protection Agency, Protecting Water Quality 
from Agricultural Runoff (March 2005) <http://www.epa.gov/owow/nps/Ag_Runoff_Fact_ 
Sheet.pdf>. 
 66 United States Department of the Interior and United States Geological Survey, ‘The Quality of 
Our Nation’s Waters: Nutrients and Pesticides’ (US Geological Survey Circular No 1225, 1999) 
26 <http://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/circ1225/pdf/index.html>. 
 67 Zev Ross and Jonathan Kaplan, Californians for Pesticide Reform, Poisoning the Air: Airborne 
Pesticides in California (1998) iv <http://www.pesticidereform.org/downloads/poisonAir.pdf>. 
 68 Diazinon is a non-synthetic organophosphate insecticide used for pest control. The United States 
Environmental Protection Agency has prohibited its use in golf courses, sod farms and common 
insect control. However, it is still approved for agricultural uses. Diazinon kills insects by inhib-
iting acetylcholinesterase, an enzyme necessary for proper nervous system function. Following 
application, traces can remain in soil for up to six weeks. 
 69 Cook, above n 1, 170. 
 70 Susan Kegley, Anne Katten and Marion Moses, Californians for Pesticide Reform, Secondhand 
Pesticides: Airborne Pesticide Drift in California (2003) 1, 7 <http://www.pesticideresearch. 
com/docs/SecondhandPcides.pdf>. 
 71 Ibid 2. 
 72 Metam-sodium is a soil fumigant widely used to kill insects. 
 73 Chlorpyrifos is used to control insect pests. Chronic exposure to chlorpyrifos has been linked to 
neurological effects, developmental disorders and autoimmune disorders. It has also been linked 
to asthma, reproductive difficulties and acute toxicity. 
 74 Kegley, above n 70, 2. 
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B  Separating People from Place 
The liberal theory of private property also presents a vision of land use which 
devalues the relationship between people and the land.75 To understand this 
point, we need to consider further the legal definition of property. Singer notes 
that ‘[p]roperty concerns legal relations among people regarding control and 
disposition of valued resources. Note well: Property concerns relations among 
people, not relations between people and things.’76 This statement reflects the 
modern view that property consists not of tangible or intangible objects, but of 
rights held between individuals in relation to the control and use of resources.77 
Thus, what we ‘own’ is not, in a legal sense, land. What we ‘own’ is a right 
against another person — the land is irrelevant. This strange abstraction was first 
proposed by Jeremy Bentham, who described property as ‘metaphysical’ and a 
‘mere conception of the mind.’78 This perspective reflects a backlash against old 
forms of property that no longer reflected the emerging economy, where land no 
longer functioned as the most important source of social wealth and power. 
Bentham proposed a unified system of property that reflected equally ‘newer 
proprietary interests such as shares in companies and copyright’.79 Significantly, 
Bentham also sought to promote efficient management and security of land title 
following the enclosure movement,80 which had forced many rural farmers off 
their land.81 
On this shift, Kenneth Vandevelde notes that ‘[c]ourts … began to define 
property as the right to value rather than to some thing.’82 Against this back-
ground, Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld presented two articles that would entrench 
the person–person idea of private property.83 His central point was that property 
weighs the ‘aggregates of abstract legal relations’ rather than deferring to 
‘figurative or fictional’84 categories of property according to distinctions 
between physical items. As a consequence of these influences, as Nicole Graham 
notes: 
 
 75 I am indebted to Nicole Graham for bringing this point to my attention. For a comprehensive 
analysis, see Nicole Graham, Lawscape: Property, Environment, Law (Routledge-Cavendish, 
2010). 
 76 Joseph William Singer, Introduction to Property (Aspen Publishers, 2nd ed, 2005) 2 (emphasis in 
original) (citations omitted). 
 77 Ibid. See also Harris, above n 36, 119. 
 78 Jeremy Bentham, ‘Security and Equality of Property’ in C B Macpherson (ed), Property: 
Mainstream and Critical Positions (University of Toronto Press, 1978) 41, 51. 
 79 Mary Sokol, ‘Bentham and Blackstone on Incorporeal Hereditaments’ (1994) 15 Journal of 
Legal History 287, 287. 
 80 See ibid 290. 
 81 See generally Jeremy Burchardt, Paradise Lost: Rural Idyll and Social Change since 1800 
(I B Tauris & Co, 2002); Jeremy Burchardt, The Allotment Movement in England, 1793–1873 
(Boydell Press, 2002). 
 82 Kenneth J Vandevelde, ‘The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Development of the 
Modern Concept of Property’ (1980) 29 Buffalo Law Review 325, 333. 
 83 See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, ‘Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning’ (1913) 23 Yale Law Journal 16; Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, ‘Fundamental Legal 
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning’ (1917) 26 Yale Law Journal 710. Note that 
Hohfeld’s work was addressed to legal concepts generally. His work is important for its clarifica-
tion and reduction of concepts relating to the recent changes experienced in property. 
 84 Hohfeld, ‘Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions’, above n 83, 24 (emphasis in original). 
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Property was no longer defined absolutely, by categories of ‘real’ or ‘personal’ 
things, because these ‘things’ were now, as ‘things’, meaningless. Instead, 
property was defined as relative, that is, by relating the rights of persons to each 
other.85 
Under Hohfeld’s influence, the person–person conception of private property 
became the dominant framework in law. Stephen Munzer notes that ‘Hohfeld’s 
vocabulary has no serious rival of its kind in intellectual clarity, rigor, and 
power.’86 While this claim will be contested in this article,87 few orthodox 
writers have questioned the environmental consequences of separating our idea 
of property from physical or intangible objects. To return to our overarching 
theme of industrial agriculture, there is no question that Hohfeld’s analysis buries 
the significance and meaning of the land that is being farmed. Relationship to 
place is irrelevant and ‘[a]ny thought to the contrary, Hohfeld argued was 
“fallacious”.’88 
This is a most extraordinary idea and one that would surely puzzle many 
farming communities that have farmed sustainably and lived on the land for 
generations. Many would certainly ignore such a suggestion and continue to 
operate in relationship with the land. However, for industrial farmers the legal 
idea of private property promotes a vision of land use that separates people from 
place. This is crucial, because without a relationship to the land, a farmer cannot 
appreciate and respond to its ecological limits. Instead, we are left with what 
Berry terms a culture of the ‘one-night stand’.89 He writes, ‘the industrial eater 
says to the svelte industrial hog, “We’ll be together at breakfast. I don’t want to 
see you before then, and I won’t care to remember you afterwards.”’90 The 
industrial method of food production forgets the ground on which it stands. It has 
the potential to treat the land as alien, something that we can exploit and wreck, 
because it is other. Further, as Hannah Arendt warns, it ‘harbors the grave danger 
that eventually no object of the world will be safe from consumption and 
annihilation through consumption.’91 Certainly we are already realising this 
danger in industrial agriculture. 
C  Fragmentation of Landscape 
Finally, the industrial system of agriculture seeks to maximise productivity by 
planting large-scale monocultural crops rather than focusing on the diverse needs 
 
 85 Graham, above n 75, 142. 
 86 Stephen R Munzer, A Theory of Property (Cambridge University Press, 1990) 19. 
 87 See also the social relations theory of property, which reinterprets Hohfeld to advance its claim 
of the social origin and importance of property. For an introduction, see Joseph William Singer 
and Jack M Beermann, ‘The Social Origins of Property’ (1993) 6 Canadian Journal of Law and 
Jurisprudence 217. 
 88 Graham, above n 75, 143. 
 89 Berry, ‘The Whole Horse’, above n 20, 7. 
 90 Ibid. 
 91 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (University of Chicago Press, 1958) 133. This is of 
critical importance for Arendt, because she views the destruction of nature as a destruction of the 
self. Nature is a condition of human life, not something that we should be separate from or de-
stroy. 
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of the broader ‘bioregion’.92 This vision is supported by the liberal idea of 
private property, which is an individual right and provides owners with distinct 
‘bundles of rights’ over land.93 Owners have no obligation to use the land in a 
manner that is consistent with or provides benefits to living systems. Freyfogle 
notes: 
Our legal conception of ownership tells us … that the land can be divided into 
distinct, discrete parcels, and that division of the Earth in this manner is sensi-
ble. … The law’s implicit message is that the physical world divides easily into 
component parts, with the water owned by A, the land by B, and the subsurface 
mineral rights by C.94 
With individual authority, owners may choose to alter the land, erect fences, 
change the direction of natural watercourses, or remove habitat and species from 
an area. While coordinated management of these ecosystems is possible in 
theory, commentators have noted that such a process is ‘costly’ and that ‘many 
people balk at them for social and cultural reasons.’95 
The biggest environmental impact caused by fragmentation is loss of biodiver-
sity caused by habitat destruction.96 ‘A global assessment of the status of modern 
species indicates that 11 percent of birds, 18 percent of mammals, 5 percent of 
fish, and 8 percent of plant species are facing extinction.’97 Harvard biologist 
Edward O Wilson estimates that 27 000 species are lost each year due to tropical 
deforestation alone.98 ‘Agriculture is the leading cause of habitat destruction in 
terrestrial ecosystems.’99 Indeed, from the middle of the 19th century to the mid-
1990s, some 1 billion hectares of forests, wetland and grassland were converted 
into farmland.100 Between 1970 and 2000 this conversion occurred at the 
extraordinary rate of 13 million hectares per year.101 As a result, over 40 per cent 
of global net primary productivity (the base of all food chains) has been taken for 
human use.102 Catherine Badgley notes that ‘[o]f the 8.9 billion hectares of the 
Earth’s land area that are capable of supporting sustainable vegetation, 1.5 billion 
hectares are currently used for production of agricultural crops and 3.3 billion 
hectares are used to pasture livestock.’103 
 
 92 The term ‘bioregion’ was coined by Peter Berg and refers to landscape that is defined through 
physical and environmental features, including watershed boundaries and soil and terrain charac-
teristics: see Peter Berg (ed), Reinhabiting a Separate Country: A Bioregional Anthology of 
Northern California (Planet Drum Foundation, 1978) 218. 
 93 See Eric T Freyfogle, Justice and the Earth: Images for Our Planetary Survival (Free Press, 
1993) 49–53. 
 94 Ibid 51. 
 95 Eric T Freyfogle, The Land We Share: Private Property and the Common Good (Island Press, 
2003) 170. 
 96 Anthony B Anderson and Clinton N Jenkins, Applying Nature’s Design: Corridors as a Strategy 
for Biodiversity Conservation (Columbia University Press, 2006) 1–2. 
 97 Catherine Badgley, ‘Can Agriculture and Biodiversity Coexist?’ in Andrew Kimbrell (ed), Fatal 
Harvest: The Tragedy of Industrial Agriculture (Island Press, 2002) 279, 280. 
 98 Edward O Wilson, The Diversity of Life (Harvard University Press, 1992) 280. 
 99 Badgley, above n 97, 280. 
100 Clay, above n 2, 46. 
101 Ibid 3. 
102 Badgley, above n 97, 280. 
103 Ibid. 
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This transformation of landscape has led to some notable species changes. The 
best documented cases concern birds. According to Kelley Tucker: 
in the past, agricultural practices left edge and field habitats that resulted in 
Neotropical migratory bird use; the recent decline of dense edge habitats and 
related larger field sizes has effected significant declines in these species. Avian 
conservationists are increasingly aware that grassland birds in eastern and west-
ern North America are declining rapidly, according to recent analyses of Breed-
ing Bird Survey data.104 
Tucker notes further that ‘[a] decline in bird species diversity suggests not only 
decreases in gross avian habitat but also decreases in diversity of plants and 
subsequently of insect and pollinator species in agricultural environments.’105 
Similar concerns for birds have been noted by a member of the United King-
dom’s Game Conservancy, which stated, ‘[w]e are facing a second silent 
spring.’106 
Biodiversity loss has also been studied in freshwater and marine habitats. 
Striking examples can be noted in the Gulf of Mexico and Baltic Sea where 
pesticide and agricultural run-off have created large dead zones.107 Before 
reaching the ocean, this run-off destroys the habitat of countless freshwater 
species.108 In Australia, the main threat to the Great Barrier Reef is ‘agricultural 
in origin.’109 In this case, ‘suspended solids from erosion and pollution from 
agrochemicals’ enter the ocean and kill many species that are dependent on 
them.110 Thus it is not just terrestrial habitats that are affected by industrial 
agriculture, but also the adjacent freshwater and marine habitats. 
I I I   TH E  AG R A R I A N  PE R S P E C T I V E 
What, then, is the countervailing idea by which we might correct the industrial 
idea? We will not have to look hard to find it, for there is only one, and that is 
agrarianism.111 
In the preceding section I described how the modern industrial system of 
agriculture is affecting human and natural health, biodiversity, the wilderness and 
ultimately food security. I also noted that underlying industrial land use practice 
is an idea of private property premised on individual preference satisfaction, a 
separation of people from place and the fragmentation of landscape. Despite the 
difficulties, we must learn to see the industrial vision for what it is and recon-
sider what it means to have ownership of land. In this section I will begin this 
 
104 Kelley R Tucker, ‘Wildlife Health’ in Andrew Kimbrell (ed), Fatal Harvest: The Tragedy of 
Industrial Agriculture (Island Press, 2002) 287, 288. 
105 Ibid. 
106 See ibid. The reference to ‘silent spring’ is to Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (Houghton Miffin, 
1962). 
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discussion by describing agrarian agriculture as a practice. I contend that by 
studying this practice, one can discern an alternative understanding of private 
property and its internal characteristics.112 Specifically, whereas the modern 
view focuses on individual rights, the agrarian view focuses on relationship and 
incorporates notions of obligation and ethical considerations. Understood in this 
way, I contend that agrarian practice can guide the development of the concept of 
private property to meet growing ecological needs. 
Perhaps the best way to introduce agrarianism is in the words of Wendell 
Berry. The ‘fundamental difference’ between agrarianism and industrial agricul-
ture is that ‘industrialism is a way of thought based on monetary capital and 
technology’ whereas ‘agrarianism is a way of thought based on land.’113 Fur-
thermore, agrarianism is both a culture and an economy. Industrialism is primar-
ily an economy and any notion of culture is an ‘accidental by-product of the 
ubiquitous effort to sell unnecessary products for more than they are worth.’114 
Agrarianism is also place-specific and arises from the attributes of a particular 
bioregion. An agrarian farmer must know intimately the lay of the land, local 
plants and animals, soil content, rainfall patterns and potential hazards. They 
must deeply consider questions such as: 
What is the best location for a particular building or fence? What is the best 
way to plow this field? What is the best course for a skid road in this wood-
land? Should this tree be cut or spared? What are the best breeds and types of 
livestock for this farm?115 
Further to these physical concerns, the agrarian farmer ‘depends and insists on 
knowing very particular local histories and biographies.’116 This allows a farmer 
to learn from the past and to keep the land healthy for future generations. 
Eric T Freyfogle provides a framework for considering the broad set of factors 
inherent to the agrarian vision of good land use. These elements can be summa-
rised under the headings ‘human good’, ‘ethics’ and ‘the land’.117 I will use his 
framework as a means to consider the agrarian vision of ownership and good 
land use. 
 
112 Freyfogle notes that ‘agrarians are themselves committed to private property’: Eric T Freyfogle, 
‘Private Property Rights in Land: An Agrarian View’ in Norman Wirzba (ed), The Essential 
Agrarian Reader: The Future of Culture, Community, and the Land (University Press of Ken-
tucky, 2003) 237, 237. Wendell Berry speaks highly of private property for the security and 
longevity it provides and the corresponding incentive to become stewards of place: see Wendell 
Berry, That Distant Land: The Collected Stories (Shoemaker & Hoard, 2005) 289–308. 
113 Berry, ‘The Whole Horse’, above n 20, 8. 
114 Ibid 9. 
115 Ibid (emphasis in original). 
116 Ibid. 
117 See Eric T Freyfogle, Why Conservation Is Failing and How It Can Regain Ground (Yale 
University Press, 2006) 144–57. Note that Freyfogle does not state that this framework repre-
sents the agrarian perspective. Note also that Freyfogle uses the following headings to describe 
his ethical concept of private property — ‘human utility’, ‘ethical considerations’ and ‘ignorance 
and precaution’. 
     
2010] What Is Good Land Use? 723 
 
     
A  The Human Community 
Human beings are interconnected and dependent on the land for survival. For 
this reason, good land use needs to meet the basic requirement of sustenance for 
all people, including food, clothing and shelter.118 There is no question that our 
current system of large-scale, centralised agriculture is failing this most basic 
requirement.119 For example, approximately 800 million people go hungry each 
day and millions live on the brink of starvation.120 Kimbrell notes that: 
In Brazil, 70 million people cannot afford enough to eat, and in India, 
200 million people go hungry every day. Even in the United States, the world’s 
number one exporter of food, 33 million men, women, and children are consid-
ered among the world’s hungry.121 
One of the popular myths of industrial agriculture, and one that keeps many of us 
tied to this system, is the idea that world hunger is a consequence of food 
scarcity and population growth.122 For example, Monsanto states on the home 
page of its website: ‘By 2050, the population is expected to reach 9 billion. To 
feed the growing population, farmers will need to produce more food in the next 
40 years than they have in the past 10,000 years combined.’123 
While population growth is an important issue, there are deeper causes under-
lying world hunger. Indeed, Kimbrell notes: 
food production has kept pace with population growth. Studies conducted by 
the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) clearly indicate that it is 
abundance, not scarcity, that best describes the world’s food supply. Every year, 
enough wheat, rice, and other grains are produced to provide every human with 
3,500 daily calories. In fact, enough food is grown worldwide to provide 4.3 
pounds of food per person per day, which would include two and a half pounds 
of grain, beans, and nuts, a pound of fruits and vegetables, and nearly another 
pound of meat, milk, and eggs.124 
A narrow focus on population growth ignores more important considerations 
such as landlessness, centralisation and food dependence. ‘The industrial system 
has, over centuries and in virtually every area of the globe, “enclosed” farmland, 
forcing subsistence peasants off the land’.125 This process is ongoing and as a 
consequence ‘untold millions of peasants lose their land, community, traditions, 
and most directly their ability to grow their own food — their food independ-
ence.’126 Once uprooted from the land, they are forced into the cities where they 
 
118 See generally Hawken, Lovins and Lovins, above n 25, 190–212. 
119 See generally Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Investing in Food 
Security, UN Doc I/I1230E/1/11.09/1000 (November 2009). 
120 Andrew Kimbrell, ‘Myth One: Industrial Agriculture Will Feed the World’ in Andrew Kimbrell 
(ed), Fatal Harvest: The Tragedy of Industrial Agriculture (Island Press, 2002) 50, 50. 
121 Ibid. 
122 See Astyk and Newton, above n 21, 233–41. 
123 Monsanto, Home <http://www.monsanto.com>. 
124 Kimbrell, ‘Myth One’, above n 120, 50. 
125 Ibid 51. 
126 Ibid. 
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quickly join the growing ranks of the urban poor competing for low paying jobs 
and dependence. Victims of the modern enclosure are becoming increasingly 
numerous: 
Just 50 years ago, only 18 percent of the population of developing countries re-
sided in cities; by the year 2000 the figure jumped to 40 percent. Unless current 
policies change, by 2030 it is estimated that 56 percent of the developing world 
will be urban dwellers. A United Nations report has found that close to 50 per-
cent of this urban population growth is due to migration, much of it forced, 
from rural to urban communities.127 
Following this enclosure, ‘both the urban and rural poor are completely food 
dependant’128 and they must purchase their food from an increasingly narrow 
market.129 Like many urban poor, the rural poor do not always have the means to 
take part in the system and as a result they starve. A report by NGO Food First 
summarised the situation as follows: ‘If you don’t have land on which to grow 
food or the money to buy it, you go hungry no matter how dramatically technol-
ogy pushes up food production.’130 
In contrast to the industrial vision for land use, there is abundant evidence that 
agrarian methods can sustain and keep pace with world population growth.131 
Numerous studies have shown that small-scale agrarian farming is more produc-
tive than large-scale industrial agriculture.132 Brian Halweil from the Worldwatch 
Institute calculates productivity at 1000 per cent more for agrarian farms.133 For 
some, this fact is counterintuitive and contradicts the industrial mantra that 
‘bigger is better’. Halweil reconciles this fact by noting that: 
big-farm advantages are always calculated on the basis of how much of one 




129 For example, in Australia the largest 10 per cent of farms are responsible for 60 per cent of total 
agricultural output, and this share is growing: Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry 
(Cth), Future Harvest: The Way Ahead for Australian Agriculture and Food (2007) 2. Concentra-
tion is even more pronounced in the retailing of Australia’s food, with two supermarket chains, 
Coles and Woolworths, controlling almost 80 per cent of food sales: Department of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Forestry (Cth), Australian Food Statistics 2006 (2007) 16. Globally, 70–80 per cent 
of the world’s grain trade is controlled by two corporations, Cargill and Archer Daniels Midland: 
see Brian Halweil, Eat Here: Reclaiming Homegrown Pleasures in a Global Supermarket 
(W W Norton & Company, 2004) 47. 
130 Kimbrell, ‘Myth One’, above n 120, 51, quoting a Food First report. 
131 This is particularly so when combined with urban farms, community gardens, community 
supported agriculture and other means of local food production. 
132 See Astyk and Newton, above n 21, 233–4. See generally Carl F Jordan, Can Organic Agricul-
ture Feed the World? <http://www.springvalleyecofarms.org/UserFiles/File/Can%20Organic% 
20Ag%20Feed%20the%20World_08132009.pdf>; David Pimentel et al, ‘Environmental, Ener-
getic, and Economic Comparisons of Organic and Conventional Farming Systems’ (2005) 55 
BioScience 573; Christos Vasilikiotis, Can Organic Farming ‘Feed the World’? (November 
2000) <http://www.cnr.berkeley.edu/~christos/articles/CV-Organic%20Farming.pdf>; Catherine 
Badgley et al, ‘Organic Agriculture and the Global Food Supply’ (2007) 22 Renewable Agricul-
ture and Food Systems 86. 
133 Halweil, Eat Here, above n 129, 75. See generally Brian Halweil, Can Organic Farming Feed 
Us All? (2006) Worldwatch Institute <http://www.worldwatch.org/node/4060>; Peter M Rosset, 
‘The Multiple Functions and Benefits of Small Farm Agriculture in the Context of Global Trade 
Negotiations’ (Policy Brief No 4, Food First, September 1999) 5–10 <http://www.foodfirst.org/ 
files/pb4.pdf>. 
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complex farm, however, is calculated on the basis of how much food overall is 
produced per acre. The smaller farm can grow several crops utilizing different 
root depths, plant heights, or nutrients on the same piece of land simultane-
ously. It is this “polyculture” that offers the small farm’s productivity advan-
tage.134 
To illustrate the difference between these two kinds of measure, Halweil ana-
lysed an average United States Midwestern corn farm. He notes that while 
industrial farming may produce more corn per hectare than a small farm, the 
latter grows corn ‘as part of a polyculture that also includes beans, squash, 
potato, and “weeds” that serve as fodder.’135 Under the care of a knowledgeable 
farmer, who understands the land and the network of relationships that exist 
therein, the polycrop produces much more food. This holds true ‘whether you 
measure in tonnes, calories, or dollars.’136 This final point was supported by the 
2002 United States Agricultural Census, which noted that the smallest category 
of farm ‘produced $15,104 per hectare and netted about $2,902 per acre.’137 The 
largest farms, ‘averaging 15,581 hectares, yielded $249 per hectare and netted 
about $52 per hectare.’138 Consistent findings have been observed in every farm-
size category. Halweil concludes that: 
The inverse relationship between farm size and output can be attributed to the 
more efficient use of land, water, and other agricultural resources that small op-
erations afford, including the efficiencies of intercropping various plants in the 
same field, planting multiple times during the year, targeting irrigation, and in-
tegrating crops and livestock. So in terms of converting inputs into outputs, so-
ciety would be better off with small-scale farmers. And as population continues 
to grow in many nations, and the amount of farmland and water available to 
each person continues to shrink, a small farm structure may become central to 
feeding the planet.139 
Of course, sustenance is not the only measure for how good land use benefits 
people. The agrarian perspective also fulfils the timeless human desire to exist in 
harmony with nature. As environmental philosopher Holmes Rolston III notes, 
‘[n]one of us lives to the fullest who does not study the natural order, and, more 
than that, none is wise who does not ultimately make peace with it.’140 Following 
this wisdom, agrarian farming views nature as a teacher, and the boundaries of a 
crop plot or location of a farmstead are informed by nature.141 The result is a 
‘lovely, environmentally sound, and socially nurturing countryside.’142 Far from 
 





139 Ibid 75–6. See also Astyk and Newton, above n 21, 233–4. 
140 Holmes Rolston III, Environmental Ethics: Duties to and Values in the Natural World (Temple 
University Press, 1988) 44. 
141 By far the most comprehensive source book on this point is Bill Mollison, Permaculture: A 
Designers’ Manual (Tagari Publications, 1988). 
142 Kimbrell, ‘Learning to See What You Are Looking at’, above n 15, 89. 
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mythical, this perspective recognises our proper place in nature and situates 
human behaviour in accordance with this recognition. Wendell Berry notes: 
The true measure of agriculture is not the sophistication of its equipment, the 
size of its income, or the statistics of its productivity, but the good health of the 
land. As many as possible should share in the ownership of the land and thus be 
bound to it by economic interests, by the investment of love and work, by fam-
ily loyalty, by memory and tradition.143 
B  Ethical Considerations 
Standing alongside human benefit is a constellation of factors that can be 
grouped under the heading ‘ethical considerations’.144 Here two points stand out 
as critical — future generations and the moral worth of nature itself.145 Turning 
first to future generations, agrarian practice holds that land use is only good if it 
is a practice that future generations can continue without diminishing the health 
and fertility of the Earth.146 This perspective marks a shift from the short-term 
focus of modern property rights towards responsibility and obligations for 
stewards yet to come. This could prove exceptionally influential if the obligation 
were defined in a comprehensive fashion. Freyfogle notes: 
If we feel obligated to protect all life forms for future generations to enjoy (a 
widely held ideal), then land use will be good only when it achieves this con-
servation result. If our duties (instead or in addition) include the maintenance of 
representative examples of all types of natural areas, or perhaps the protection 
of the land’s overall natural productive capacity, then land use again will be 
good only if these duties are fulfilled. Land use is not good when these duties 
are breached.147 
A duty towards future generations must be a collective duty and ‘require[s] 
planning at large spatial scales.’148 Currently, the industrial system and its focus 
on private property promote land use for the benefit of current generations and 
the property owner above all.149 Although the market does permit landowners to 
farm in a manner that respects future generations, individuals can have little 
overall impact acting alone. Only through collective action is it possible to fulfil 
this duty in any meaningful way.150 To argue otherwise is to deny that duties to 
future generations exist at all.151 
Aside from duties to future generations, there is a growing movement towards 
the recognition of nature’s intrinsic value. Intrinsic value can be defined as ‘all 
value possessed by nature that is unrelated to human utility.’152 While philoso-
 
143 Ibid. Kimbrell attributes the passage to Wendell Berry. 
144 Freyfogle, Why Conservation Is Failing, above n 117, 148–53. 
145 Ibid. 
146 Ibid 149. 
147 Ibid. 
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phers rigorously debate whether nature can have ‘value’ independent of human 
consideration,153 for our purpose it is sufficient to note that if nature is valuable, 
then good land use ought to respect its value. This applies whether the value is 
intrinsic or extrinsic. Recognition of nature’s value can reside at the level of the 
biotic community154 or at the level of species. This would first require humans to 
respect nature, and then perhaps a duty not to interfere with nature’s functioning. 
In several farming communities in rural Pennsylvania in the United States this 
idea has been taken one step further, and municipal ordinances have been passed 
that recognise that nature has the right to exist and flourish.155 For example, the 
town of Tamaqua was facing devastating health and environmental impacts from 
sludge being dumped by local agribusiness. Thomas Linzey and Anneke Camp-
bell describe the situation further: 
After years of absorbing egregious amounts of toxic waste, Tamaqua grew tired 
of trying to get environmental protection laws to work for them. … Because 
they had come to recognize that their lives were not separate from nature, but 
instead profoundly interdependent, the people in Tamaqua sought to have their 
local laws reflect this new understanding. This meant they would have to dis-
card the old notion of ‘environmental protection’ and instead learn to think of 
ecosystems as having their own inalienable rights.156 
An extract from the ordinance passed by the Tamaqua council reads: 
It shall be unlawful for any corporation or its directors, officers, owners, or 
managers to interfere with the existence and flourishing of natural communities 
or ecosystems, or to cause damage to those natural communities and ecosys-
tems.157 
Municipal ordinances like this have been adopted elsewhere in the United States, 
for example in New Hampshire and Virginia, and are currently being debated in 
Spokane in Washington and Pittsburgh in Pennsylvania.158 The proposed 
ordinance for Spokane uses more explicit language: 
 
the Act is to promote the use and management of natural resources in a manner that ‘recognises 
and protects the intrinsic values of natural resources’. 
153 See, eg, Rolston, above n 140; Nicholas Agar, Life’s Intrinsic Value: Science, Ethics, and Nature 
(Columbia University Press, 2001); Lawrence E Johnson, A Morally Deep World: An Essay on 
Moral Significance and Environmental Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
154 The term ‘biotic community’ was coined by Karl Möbius to describe interacting organisms living 
together in a habitat. See Karl Möbius, The Oyster and Oyster-Culture (H J Rice trans, United 
States Commission of Fish and Fisheries, 1880) [trans of: Die Auster und die Austernwirthschaft 
(first published 1877)]. This translation is contained in United States Commission of Fish and 
Fisheries, Report of the Commissioner for 1880 (1880) 683. 
155 See Peter Burdon, ‘The Rights of Nature: Reconsidered’ (2010) 49 Australian Humanities 
Review 69, 73. For samples of these ordinances see Thomas Linzey and Anneke Campbell, Be 
the Change: How to Get What You Want in Your Community (Gibbs Smith, 2009). 
156 Linzey and Campbell, above n 155, 67. 
157 Ibid 78. 
158 See ibid 133. Note also that in 2008 the Constitution of Ecuador recognised the rights of nature: 
see at 134–5. Bolivia has also drafted and put before the United Nations a Declaration for 
Mother Earth Rights: see Mother Earth, Mother Earth: Harmony with Nature 
<http://motherearthrights.org>. 
     
728 Melbourne University Law Review  [Vol 34 
     
Ecosystems, including but not limited to, all groundwater systems, surfacewater 
systems, and aquifers have the right to exist and flourish. River systems have 
the right to flow and have water quality necessary to provide habitat for native 
plants and animals, and to provide clean drinking water. Aquifers have the right 
to sustainable recharge, flow, and water quality.159 
The primary consequence of recognising legal rights in nature is that it places 
duties on human property owners. In Hohfeld’s terminology, the most suitable 
legal category for nature is a claim right, defined as ‘claims correlative to other 
persons’ duties’.160 Put another way, claim rights generate reasons for action for 
people who are in a position to help in the promotion or protection of the 
underlying right. In discussing human obligations, Immanuel Kant drew a 
helpful distinction between perfect and imperfect duties.161 A perfect duty is a 
direct and immediate duty to take a course of action or refrain from a particular 
enterprise.162 However, for others there are responsibilities, even though they are 
less specific and come in the general form of what Kant called ‘imperfect 
duties’. In the context of claim rights, the obligation is to consider ways through 
which environmental harm can be prevented (or minimised) and then decide on a 
reasonable course of action. Properly conceived, this framework has the potential 
to radically alter human interaction with nature and marks a shift away from 
exclusive rights to a reciprocal relationship which includes duties and responsi-
bilities. 
C  The Land 
A well-conceived definition of good land use will consider at length the first 
two themes. However, at a minimum, the agrarian perspective requires us to 
consider the question of good land use from the perspective of the land and the 
non-human community that dwells upon it. This entails an intimate understand-
ing of place and knowledge of its needs and the roles it performs. For 
Kirkpatrick Sale, this is the most important element of good land use: 
The kinds of soils and rocks under our feet; the source of the waters we drink; 
the meaning of the different kinds of winds; the common insects, birds, mam-
mals, plants, and trees; the particular cycles of the seasons; the times to plant 
and harvest and forage — these are the things that are necessary to know. The 
limits of its resources; the carrying capacities of its lands and waters; the places 
where it must not be stressed; the places where its bounties can best be devel-
oped; the treasures it holds and the treasures it withholds — these are the things 
that must be understood. And the cultures of the people, of the populations na-
tive to the land and of those who have grown up with it, the human social and 
 
159 Spokane Municipal Council, Envisioning a Sustainable Spokane: A Community Bill of Rights, 
cl 5 <http://www.envisionspokane.org/Community%20Bill%20of%20Rights%20-%20 
Amendments.doc>. 
160 Brian H Bix, Jurisprudence: Theory and Context (Thomson Reuters, 5th ed, 2009) 134. 
161 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason (Lewis White Beck trans, Bobbs-Merrill, 1956) 69 
[trans of: Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (first published 1788)]; Immanuel Kant, Groundwork 
for the Metaphysics of Morals (Arnulf Zweig trans, Oxford University Press, 2002) 222 [trans 
of: Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (first published 1785)]. See also Amartya Sen, ‘Con-
sequential Evaluation and Practical Reason’ (2000) 97 Journal of Philosophy 477, 494–8. 
162 Kant, above n 161, 222. 
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economic arrangements shaped by and adapted to the geomorphic ones, in both 
urban and rural settings — these are the things that must be appreciated.163 
Consistent with this task, Wes Jackson notes that farmers must look to nature 
as the standard or as the measure for their action.164 With his colleagues at The 
Land Institute,165 Jackson has carried out this idea through the Natural Systems 
Agriculture program.166 The goal of the program is to carry out agriculture by 
relying on naturally occurring ecological benefits and disturbing the pre-existing 
ecosystem as little as possible. Jackson notes that ‘[w]e look to the never-plowed 
native prairie to be our teacher.’167 Prairies are excellent teachers because they 
sustain a great diversity of species, which are nearly all perennial. Because their 
roots do not rot away like annual roots, they hold soil through all seasons168 and, 
as a consequence, can be studied all year round. Moreover, perennial plants 
actually build soil and give back to the ecological system. The ecosystem thus 
maintains its own health, is fuelled by the energy from the sun and recycles 
nutrients. All of this is achieved at no cost or detriment to human beings or to the 
planet.169 Jackson notes further that: 
wherever there is prairie, four functional groups are featured: warm-season 
grasses, cool-season grasses, legumes, and composites. Other species are pre-
sent, but these groups are featured. Different species fill different roles. Some 
thrive in dry years, others in wet ones. Some provide fertility by fixing atmos-
pheric nitrogen. Some tolerate shade, others require direct sunlight. Some repel 
insect predators. Some do better on poor, rocky soils while others need rich, 
deep soil. Diversity provides the system with built-in resilience to changes and 
cycles in climate, water, insects and pests, grazers, and other natural distur-
bances.170 
The challenge set by Jackson and his team is to combine ‘species diversity and 
perennialism.’171 To match the needs of the prairie they use four functional 
groups in their polyculture and seek to ensure that the groups produce harvest-
able grain for direct human consumption.172 They then imitate the prairie and 
produce harvest through the services it naturally performs. The results of this 
work have been extraordinary, and as Jackson notes, ‘[p]roperly designed, the 
system itself should virtually eliminate the ecological degradation characteristic 
of conventional agriculture and minimize the need for human intervention.’173 
 
163 Kirkpatrick Sale, Dwellers in the Land: The Bioregional Vision (Sierra Club Books, 1985) 42. 
164 Wes Jackson, ‘Farming in Nature’s Image: Natural Systems Agriculture’ in Andrew Kimbrell 
(ed), Fatal Harvest: The Tragedy of Industrial Agriculture (Island Press, 2002) 41, 43. See also 
Wes Jackson, New Roots for Agriculture (Friends of the Earth, 1980). 
165 See The Land Institute, The Land Institute <http://www.landinstitute.org/>. 
166 See The Land Institute, Natural Systems Agriculture (28 March 2006) <http://www. 
landinstitute.org/vnews/display.v/ART/2000/08/05/377bbbe53>. 
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This method of agriculture is spreading across the globe and being imitated in 
smaller family farms. For example, just north of Adelaide is the Brookman 
family’s farm, The Food Forest.174 This farm is situated on just 15 hectares, but 
supports agroforestry and over 150 organically certified crops, and it has 
maintained the local ecosystem for hundreds of varieties of birds, lizards and 
small mammals.175 Pest and weed control is assisted by the introduction of geese 
and bettongs. Soil fertility is maintained through composting organic waste, 
planting legumes, and animal waste. Through intelligent design, the Brookmans 
also estimate that their water use is between four per cent to 10 per cent of that 
used by the average Australian orchard.176 Consistent with Jackson’s Natural 
Systems Agriculture program, land use for the Brookmans is a constant process 
of reassessment and adjustment. It is a practice of listening to the land and 
learning from natural systems. Finally, it is the express recognition that good 
land use is a mutual relationship that includes obligations and not just rights. 
IV  CO N C L U S I O N:  FR O M  RIGHTS TO  RE L ATI O N S H I P  
Property belongs to a family of words that, if we can free them from the deni-
grations that shallow politics and social fashion have imposed on them, are the 
words, the ideas, that govern our connections with the world and with one an-
other: property, proper, appropriate, propriety.177 
Over the centuries, western culture has never seriously considered giving up 
the institution of private property or reducing its importance. However, there has 
been rigorous debate about what it means to own land. This is where agrarianism 
can exercise the most influence, in particular its emphasis on relationship as an 
integral part of ownership. In this context, the term ‘relationship’ is broader than 
interpersonal relationships and includes relationship with place, recognition of 
ecosystem relationships and ethical considerations. I contend that an approach to 
land use that overlooks any of these considerations is deficient and deserves to 
be labelled as such. 
Importantly, the key to evolving the idea of private property lies within the 
theory itself. For all its shortcomings, liberal theory allows us, both as individu-
als and as a collective, to choose our own idea of land ownership. Where we are 
provided with the choice to destroy, we can preserve; to separate, we can bond; 
and to fragment, we can integrate. This freedom is demonstrated in local 
ventures such as The Food Forest, and more extensively, in international peasant 
movements such as La Via Campesina178 and Navdanya.179 If conducted on a 
 
174 See The Food Forest, The Food Forest: Permaculture Farm and Learning Centre <http://www. 
foodforest.com.au/>. 
175 See The Food Forest, The Food Forest <http://www.foodforest.com.au/theFoodForest.htm>. 
176 Annemarie Brookman and Graham Brookman, ‘Commercial Scale Permaculture at The Food 
Forest’ (Paper presented at the 2005 National Permaculture Convergence, Melbourne, 2005) 5 
<http://www.foodforest.com.au/academic%20papers.html#academic%20papers>. 
177 Wendell Berry, ‘Whose Head Is the Farmer Using? Whose Head Is Using the Farmer?’ in Wes 
Jackson, Wendell Berry and Bruce Colman (eds), Meeting the Expectations of the Land: Essays 
in Sustainable Agriculture and Stewardship (North Point Press, 1984) 19, 30. 
178 See La Via Campesina, La Via Campesina <http://viacampesina.org/main_en/>. 
179 See Navdanya, Navdanya <http://www.navdanya.org/>. 
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broad scale, this positive action can transform our understanding of what it 
means to own a piece of land — it can transform our idea of private property. In 
considering this point, it is important to note that private property is not a fixed 
institution. Instead, just like every other aspect of our law, it changes to reflect 
the shared values of society.180 
From studying the agrarian vision of good land use, we can extrapolate the 
following principles that are relevant to revising the current idea of private 
property. To begin, the ownership model, which isolates the landowner from the 
community and focuses on individual freedom,181 needs to be fundamentally 
revised. This is the starting premise behind a growing social relations movement 
in property theory. The first advocates of this view were the early American legal 
realists.182 For example, while maintaining that private property grants a type of 
‘sovereignty’ to property owners, Morris Cohen added that a property right also 
creates a relationship between the right holder and others.183 Felix Cohen added 
an important modification to the conventional absolutist view of private prop-
erty: 
Private property is a relationship among human beings such that the so-called 
owner can exclude others from certain activities or permit others to engage in 
those activities and in either case secure the assistance of the law in carrying 
out his decision.184 
From this perspective, private property is a dynamic social construct. Indeed, 
property rights are best viewed as legal rules that shape the contours of human 
relationships concerning the use and allocation of valuable resources. Rather 
than being acontextual, property is deeply informed by the cultural, political and 
ideological beliefs of a given society.185 As Jennifer Nedelsky argues, ‘what 
rights in fact do and have always done is construct relationships — of power, of 
responsibility, of trust, of obligation.’186 Property law thus creates a setting in 
which people live their lives and interact with each other. While this might 
appear an affront to autonomy, Nedelsky reminds us that ‘[w]hat makes auton-
omy possible is not separation, but relationship.’187 We respect individuals, not 
through isolation, but by acknowledging that they best function and achieve their 
own ends through social relations that support their potential to flourish. Interde-
 
180 For a comprehensive account, see generally Richard Schlatter, Private Property: The History of 
an Idea (Allen & Unwin, 1951). 
181 See Eric T Freyfogle, Boundless People, Boundless Lands: Envisioning a New Land Ethic 
(Island Press, 1998) 100. 
182 Note that Hohfeld also described rights as constituting jural relations: Hohfeld, ‘Some Funda-
mental Legal Conceptions’, above n 83, 30–2. 
183 Morris R Cohen, ‘Property and Sovereignty’ (1927) 13 Cornell Law Quarterly 8, 12. 
184 Felix S Cohen, ‘Dialogue on Private Property’ (1954) 9 Rutgers Law Review 357, 373. 
185 Babie, ‘How We Control the Environment and Others’, above n 37. Commenting on this point, 
Michael A Heller notes that ‘[u]nderstanding what is private property is an inductive and itera-
tive process, one that looks to the chaos of real world relations’: Michael A Heller, ‘Three Faces 
of Private Property’ (2000) 79 Oregon Law Review 417, 432. 
186 Jennifer Nedelsky, ‘Reconceiving Rights as Relationship’ (1993) 1 Review of Constitutional 
Studies 1, 13. 
187 Ibid 8. 
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pendence is the foundational characteristic of free individuals.188 Underkuffler 
notes that this presents a ‘different concept of individual well-being and auton-
omy: one that recognizes the individual’s need for freedom as well as the need 
for the development and expression of that freedom in the context of relatedness 
to others.’189 
The social origin of property requires us to reconceptualise rights as establish-
ing socially contingent boundaries.190 Property law must establish a setting in 
which individuals can live their lives and have meaningful relationships with 
others. This setting consists of rules requiring individuals to respect the legiti-
mate interests of others, including the community and the environment. From 
this perspective, ownership is not strictly an individual entitlement and is 
justified by reference to the aggregate good of all.191 The common good is 
fostered when people are free to flourish as individuals and when laws constrain 
socially harmful activities.192 Thus, individual liberty is promoted only to the 
extent that its recognition promotes the overall good. Singer notes further: 
Rather than understanding rights and autonomy as ‘an effort to carve out a 
sphere into which the collective cannot intrude,’ we understand that because 
rights conflict, we must define them partially in terms of the relationships they 
instantiate. Property law can therefore be seen as ‘a means of structuring the 
relations between individuals and the sources of collective power so that auton-
omy is fostered rather than undermined.’193 
Our idea of private property can also shift from interpersonal rights to recog-
nise the importance of the object itself, ie the land. David Lametti, a Canadian 
theorist, recognises this point by defining private property as a ‘relationship 
between or among individuals through objects of social wealth’.194 This ‘appar-
ently slight change’ expressly provides that the object of a property relation has a 
 
188 Ibid. 
189 Laura S Underkuffler, ‘On Property: An Essay’ (1990) 100 Yale Law Journal 127, 129. 
190 Singer, The Edges of the Field, above n 44, 3. 
191 Note that this has long been the practice in indigenous communities. While certainly a valuable 
point of comparative analysis, this discussion is beyond the scope of the present article. For a 
useful introduction, see Deborah Bird Rose, Dingo Makes Us Human: Life and Land in an Aus-
tralian Aboriginal Culture (Cambridge University Press, 2000) 106–22. See generally Poh Ling 
Tan et al, Collaborative Water Planning: Context and Practice — Literature Review: Volume 1 
(September 2008) <http://lwa.gov.au/files/products/track/pn21213/pn21213.pdf>; Janice Gray, 
‘Watered Down? Legal Constructs, Tradable Entitlements and the Regulation of Water’ in Dev-
leena Ghosh, Heather Goodall and Stephanie Hemelryk Donald (eds), Water, Sovereignty and 
Borders in Asia and Oceania (Routledge, 2009) 147. 
192 See generally Freyfogle, The Land We Share, above n 95, 101–34. A broad discussion on the 
justifications for private property can be found in Harris, above n 36, 163–369. 
193 Joseph William Singer, Entitlement: The Paradoxes of Property (Yale University Press, 2000) 
131 (citations omitted). 
194 David Lametti, ‘The Concept of Property: Relations through Objects of Social Wealth’ (2003) 53 
University of Toronto Law Journal 325, 326 (emphasis in original). Lametti offers the following 
definition of private property: 
Private property is a social institution that comprises a variety of contextual relationships 
among individuals through objects of social wealth and is meant to serve a variety of individ-
ual and collective purposes. It is characterized by allocating to individuals a measure of control 
over the use and alienation of, some degree of exclusivity in the enjoyment of, and some 
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role in the property relationship itself.195 Further, recognition of the object can 
shape the contours of the property relationship and define its rights and duties. 
Lametti notes, ‘[c]ontrary to the dominant rights-based paradigm, the re-
definition allows specific objects of property to carry with them duties of 
stewardship or obligations to use in a certain manner.’196 Lametti describes this 
aspect as the ‘deon-telos’ or the deontology of private property. The term ‘deon’ 
derives from Greek and means ‘duty’ or ‘that which binds’. In the context of 
private property, this term ‘identifies specific duties and responsibilities con-
tained in legal property norms and their justification, emanating from a variety of 
sources, whether universal imperatives or more specific types of moral and 
ethical duties.’197 The term ‘telos’ also stems from Greek and means ‘goal’ or 
‘end point’. In advancing this concept, Lametti is seeking to include societal 
goals and values into the idea of private property.198 
The function of the deon-telos is to limit the free choices of property holders. 
In the liberal view of private property, it is accepted that limitations can be 
placed on property rights. Legislation regulating noise pollution and environ-
mental pollution are good examples. However, such limitations are considered 
external to the rights themselves and thus outside the concept of private property. 
Lametti is not concerned with such external limitations. For him, any discussion 
of private property that excludes the deon-telos and its goals, guides, and 
responsibilities, is incomplete, so that ‘[t]hose aspects of private property 
captured by the rubric of the deon-telos are an intrinsic component of the concept 
of private property itself’.199 This is particularly important in the absence of 
express external limitation rules. Paul Babie explains further: 
In other words, the deon-telos is not a mere external property-limitation rule, it 
is part of private property itself. It acts as an internal moral or ethical, rather 
than a merely external legal, limitation on the way in which the holder of pri-
vate property may exercise, in a preference-satisfying way, any particular right 
encompassed by the bundle of rights.200 
Lametti’s argument is groundbreaking, particularly the suggestion that limita-
tions to property rights are internal to the concept itself. With an understanding 
of deon-telos, property theorists can begin to frame their discussion in light of 
the obligations, responsibilities and other ethical considerations that are pertinent 
to land use practices. While Lametti’s work is theoretical, it resembles the 
concept of property currently articulated in German law. For example, art 14(2) 
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same time serve the common good.’201 This provision has been interpreted to 
highlight the importance of ‘social connectedness and social bonding … without 
encroaching upon the intrinsic value of the person.’202 Further, it has also been 
interpreted to include environmental responsibility203 and a social responsibility 
to refrain from anti-social uses of property.204 
Finally, by conceptualising private property as person–thing relationship, the 
‘thing’ itself, with its unique attributes and needs, comes back into focus. In the 
context of land use, the duties and responsibilities recognised as inherent in the 
concept of private property could be specific to the land itself. Indeed, a dry field 
is not the same as a fertile plain and property law should not treat the two land 
types alike. This reasoning was specifically recognised by the Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin in Just v Marinette County.205 In the context of damage done to a 
sensitive wetland, the Court held: 
An owner of land has no absolute and unlimited right to change the essential 
natural character of his land so as to use it for a purpose for which it was un-
suited in its natural state and which injures the rights of others. The exercise of 
the police power in zoning must be reasonable and we think it is not an unrea-
sonable exercise of that power to prevent harm to public rights by limiting the 
use of private property to its natural uses.206 
In this case, the rights associated with private property were expressly limited to 
uses that were ‘consistent with the nature of the land’.207 In regard to the wetland 
in question, its use had to be consistent with its continued ecological health. Such 
a perspective is clearly the reverse of many ecologically insensitive agricultural 
practices, such as growing rice in arid South Australia. Yet if this idea were taken 
seriously it could serve several functions. Linking property rights to the land 
could promote relationship to place and increase understanding of the ecological 
systems that support human life. Further, landowners could manage their land 
with greater awareness and respect for the living system that surrounds their 
 
201 Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Basic Law of the Federal Republic of 
Germany] art 14(2). This article was derived from art 153 of the Die Verfassung des Deutschen 
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tional Setting (International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, 1976) 17–
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boundaries. Thus, rather than being a tool for fragmentation, private property 
could serve as a means for coordination and joint management. 
At the dawn of the environmental movement, Aldo Leopold wrote ‘[w]e abuse 
land because we regard it as a commodity belonging to us. When we see land as 
a community to which we belong, we may begin to use it with love and re-
spect.’208 Such a shift in our attitudes is precisely what is required in the context 
of the agricultural crisis. For too long, individuals and industrial bodies have 
been operating under an individualistic and absolutist view of private property. 
There is now abundant evidence that this conception is facilitating a form of land 
use practice that is leading to environmental disaster. What is needed is not the 
abandonment of private property, but an informed shift in what it means to own 
the land. At the heart of this shift is the understanding that the land is one part of 
a comprehensive community to which human beings belong. This change in 
focus expands our attention from isolated individuals towards a network of 
relationships. Like any other worthwhile relationship, private property must be 
understood as including responsibilities, duties and obligations as well as rights. 
If we can reconceptualise our relationship with the land from rights to relation-
ship then there is every chance that we can engage with the Earth in a way that is 
mutually beneficial. Forming this relationship is not only critical for the present 
generation, but for many generations to come. 
 
208 Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac, and Sketches Here and There (Oxford University Press, 
1949) vii. 
